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struggle unfolded in the summer of 1968. Yes, Abe Fortas was 
some sort of liberal. But he was defeated not simply because he was 
a liberal (does anyone doubt that a Philip Hart would have been 
confirmed at that time?), but because he truly did lack "judicial 
temperament." And no one knew this better than Fortas himself. 
MR. JUSTICE BLACK AND HIS CRITICS. By Tinsley E. 
Yarbrough.1 Durham, North Carolina: Duke University 
Press. 1989. Pp. xii, 323. Cloth, $45.00. 
James Magee2 
Justice Hugo Black was Franklin Roosevelt's first appointee to 
the Supreme Court. His tenure coincided with the transformation 
of the judicial agenda from one preoccupied with property rights to 
the modern predominance of civil rights and liberties. Beyond 
doubt, he played a major role in fashioning the triumphs of the 
Warren Court, and by any measure he was one of the most influen-
tial jurists in our constitutional history. 
The Nine Old Men were often assailed for protecting property 
interests in the guise of enforcing the Constitution. Senator Black, 
elected in 1926 and serving in the Senate until his appointment to 
the Court, was one of the most relentless of the Court's critics, and 
he knew very well that more than text, first principles, or original 
intent produced the judicial dogmas that were erected to invalidate 
progressive legislation. 
As a Justice, Black in turn was criticized and even ridiculed 
when he insisted that the many novel judicial results that he 
reached in protecting civil rights and liberties were derived merely 
from fidelity to the law. 
Black drew critics from across the spectrum: conservatives 
who challenged his liberalism as lawless; liberals disappointed that 
their erstwhile hero appeared to forsake the cause amidst the social 
turmoil of the 1960s; and legal scholars, some of whom found his 
jurisprudence simplistic. Alexander Bickel dismissed Black's juris-
prudence as a fake, concluding that reliance on textualism was-as 
had been true of his disingenuous predecessors-a smokescreen to 
foster political convictions.3 Black's "achievement," he observed, 
I. Professor of Political Science, East Carolina University. 
2. Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Delaware. 
3. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 84-113 (1962). 
164 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 7:163 
had been "to adapt the old style to a substance of his own."4 
Scores of critics have discovered inconsistencies, unpersuasive 
interpretations, false history, and sometimes arbitrary choices in 
Black's judicial record. In thirty-four years of judging, one would 
expect some inconsistencies, bur Black admitted to only one change 
of mind: his recantation in the Second Flag Salute Case. In his 
Carpentier lectures at Columbia and his extraordinary CBS televi-
sion interview in 1968 he adamantly claimed that otherwise his ju-
risprudence had remained consistent. 
In this book, Professor Tinsley Yarbrough analyzes the Jus-
tice's jurisprudence and addresses some (not all) of the charges of 
Black's critics. Surprisingly, for instance, Yarbrough offers nothing 
directly in reply to Bickel's devastating and sarcastic assault on 
Black's alleged discovery of literal absolutes in the Bill of Rights. 
Nevertheless, Professor Yarbrough does cover the major elements 
of Black's judicial philosophy: his incorporation thesis, his first 
amendment jurisprudence, and his treatment of what Yarbrough 
calls the "flexible clauses" such as the fourth amendment and the 
equal protection clause. 
As one might anticipate from Yarbrough's earlier studies of 
Black, he is still "convinced that, early as well as late in his career, 
Justice Black was essentially consistent in both his approach to the 
judge's role and construction of specific constitutional provisions 
and that his interpretations are generally well grounded in the Con-
stitution's text and history." Swimming against a tide of scholar-
ship challenging the very possibility of constitutional interpretation, 
Yarbrough offers Black's career as a model of lawful judging-"a 
workable, if imperfect, alternative to noninterpretivist conceptions 
of the judicial role" that have proliferated in recent decades. 
Yarbrough believes that, "Black's positivist tenets, rather than 
his policy preferences, furnish the key to an understanding of his 
approach to specific constitutional issues, giving coherence and con-
sistency to his judicial career." Yarbrough's definition of "positiv-
ism" is somewhat idiosyncratic. Positivists, he explains, distinguish 
between law and morality; see lawmaking as a role for legislators, 
not judges; try to base their interpretations of statutes and constitu-
tions on the intent of the framers as measured primarily by the lit-
eral language of the provisions construed; and insist upon clear and 
consistent standards, shunning amorphous doctrines. These are, in-
deed, concerns that preoccupied Black throughout his judicial ca-
4. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 19 (1970). 
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reer, leading Yarbrough to state that "the Justice would appear to 
have been the preeminent positivist jurist." 
If there are no correct answers, positivism (in Yarbrough's 
sense) is an illusion. Yarbrough's burden, therefore, is to show that 
Black's answers were more constitutionally correct-pace Bickel-
than those of, say, Justice Sutherland. 
I 
If a judge claims that his primary criterion in constitutional 
interpretation is the document's plain language, one might expect 
him to arrive at fairly conventional conclusions. Certainly it would 
be surprising for such a judge to reach results with which hardly 
anyone else agrees. In his dogmatic way Black frequently exagger-
ated the clarity of the bare text of the Constitution, and especially of 
the first amendment. 
If a positivist's construction of constitutional language leads to 
incoherence, we have further reason to be doubtful. Concerning 
legislative reapportionment, the language of the fourteenth amend-
ment, especially combined with the terms of the fifteenth amend-
ment, literally refutes the proposition that the equal protection 
clause leads straight to equality of voting rights; yet the text, so he 
claimed, was decisive for Black. Section 2 of the fourteenth amend-
ment acknowledges that a state may deny the right to vote alto-
gether to some of its residents, if it is willing to incur a reduction of 
its representation in Congress. And what was the purpose of the 
fifteenth amendment (guaranteeing that the right to vote shall not 
be denied on account of race) if, as the reapportionment cases pre-
sume, the fourteenth-obviously addressed to racial discrimina-
tion-already had covered the subject of voting? 
Yarbrough concludes that Black's allegiance to the "one per-
son, one vote" standard "is compatible with his positivist reliance 
on language and historical intent." This is true, he says, 
"[w]hatever the accuracy of his interpretation" of the Constitution. 
But if we accept the notion that "accuracy" is immaterial in assess-
ing a judge's position, the only issue is sincerity. On that issue, Jus-
tice Sutherland's credentials are at least as good as Justice Black's. 
We might as well conclude that if a positivist sincerely believes that 
the earth is flat, we must respect his sincerity as a positivist 
:'whatever the accuracy" of his or her appraisal of the earth's physi-
cal structure. Black's sincerity-which there is little reason to 
doubt-is an inadequate defense to the charges of inconsistency and 
subjectivity. 
Adding to the confusion, Yarbrough writes that as a good posi-
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tivist "Black questioned the wisdom of judicial constructions which 
allowed the ... [equal protection clause's] reach to extend beyond 
its historic racial roots." In light of this attitude, concedes Yar-
brough, it was "ironic" that Black accepted the "one person, one 
vote" doctrine. "Ironic" is a mild appraisal of Black's posture, par-
ticularly since shortly thereafter he became one of the most caustic 
opponents of the Court's extensive use of the "new" equal protec-
tion doctrine to promote "fundamental" interests other than racial 
equality. 
Yarbrough rightly observes that the one person, one vote stan-
dard has several virtues cherished by positivists. It is clear; it limits 
judicial discretion; and ordinary citizens can understand it. Grant-
ing all this, it remains true that Black's votes in reapportionment 
cases were inconsistent with his professed reliance on the constitu-
tional text. 
Admittedly, it is difficult to construe the indefinite domain of 
the equal protection clause. One of Yarbrough's most important 
contributions in this book reveals Black's frustration. In one of two 
interviews in 1970 and 1971 that he conducted with Black, the Jus-
tice confessed that it might have been "better" had the equal protec-
tion clause "never been adopted ... , that the clause should perhaps 
have been left out of the constitution altogether." 
Apparently for the sake of constitutional clarity, Black would 
have preferred to amend his legal bible, despite his public state-
ments that he cherished every word of it. If not deleted altogether, 
the equal protection clause, he said, should have been worded more 
precisely, or judicially confined to race. Yet, as a Justice, Black did 
not seek to confine the clause to racial discrimination. In addition 
to his venture into legislative reapportionment, Black was in the 
majority in Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942) where the Court planted 
the seeds of the "new" equal protection doctrine (which an acerbic 
Black would later condemn as a distortion of the Constitution), 
reading that clause to reach and protect the "fundamental right" to 
procreate, a right with no textual roots. Yarbrough finds Black's 
equal protection positions "the least satisfying element of his juris-
prudence" though he struggles to persuade us that "[i]n the main" 
Black's spotted equal protection record "was compatible with his 
broader jurisprudence." 
Black's understandable aversion to the indeterminacy of the 
equal protection clause also presumably induced his bizarre treat-
ment of the wide-open ninth amendment. In his "Bill of Rights" 
address in 1960, Black-without specifying the contents of the 
ninth amendment-stated that its language "strongly emphasizes 
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the desire of the Framers to protect individual liberty." But he dis-
sented in Griswold, a case that provided an opportunity to exploit 
this apparently limitless reservoir of rights. Black's Griswold dis-
sent insisted that the ninth amendment merely emphasized the lim-
ited power of the federal government, a theory that seems to make 
the tenth amendment redundant. 
Yarbrough claims that Black's position was perfectly compati-
ble with legal positivism; the ninth amendment, he argues, is "a 
threat to democratic principles." This is akin to wishing the equal 
protection clause had never been adopted. Yarbrough also main-
tains that Black's view does not make the tenth amendment redun-
dant, for the tenth emphasizes the limits of the federal government 
vis-a-vis state power, while the ninth emphasizes those same limits 
vis-a-vis the liberty of the people. Yet literally the tenth touches 
both these matters: "The powers not delegated to the United States 
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved 
to the States respectively, or to the people." The ninth seems at the 
very least to acknowledge that some additional rights (though unde-
fined) are protected against federal power, and Black in 1960 al-
luded to the ninth as a circumscription also upon state power. Such 
confusion does not improve the batting average of a positivist. 
Black's avoidance of the ninth amendment, while perfectly 
compatible with his positivist inclination toward precise standards, 
contradicted the positivist's obligation to interpret the text as 
written. 
Certainly doctrinal consistency over time is an indispensable 
measure of the accomplishments of a successful positivist. In some 
areas, Black was indeed consistent. For example, once committed 
to his absolutist view of the first amendment, Black consistently 
protected pornography and libel. Yarbrough offers many illustra-
tions of his claim that similar consistency was characteristic of 
Black's performance in other areas. On the whole, I am not 
persuaded. 
Let two examples suffice. Article I, Section 10 stipulates, 
among other things, that "No State shall ... pass any ... Law 
impairing the Obligation of Contracts." This sounds as absolute as 
the first amendment's protection of freedom of speech. For Yar-
brough, Black's dissent in El Paso v. Simmons (1965) was predict-
able, because the Court there upheld a state law modifying the 
terms of a contract involving public land sales. "Black considered 
this 'modification' a clear violation of the contract clause and ridi-
culed the majority's rationale for upholding the scheme." In his 
usual way, Black attacked the Court's balancing of interests to cir-
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cumvent a "plain" constitutional prohibition. The Simmons Court 
was following Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, where 
Chief Justice Hughes had said that the contract clause was to be 
pragmatically interpreted, that it is "not an absolute one and is not 
to be read with literal exactness like a mathematical formula."s 
This flexible construction of an absolute constitutional com-
mand was, as Yarbrough repeatedly reminds us, anathema to Black. 
Yarbrough ignores, however, an earlier decision from which Black 
dissented. In Wood v. Lovett the Court struck down an Arkansas 
law as violative of the contract clause. Black, as Yarbrough likes to 
say, "vigorously" dissented; he recounted the economic conditions 
of the Great Depression that gave rise to the state law and then 
condemned the Court's rigid application of the contract clause: 
[I]t would go far towards paralyzing the legislative ann of state governments to say 
that no legislative body could ever pass a law which would impair in any manner 
any contractual obligation of any kind. Upon a recognition of this basic truth rests 
the decision in the Blaisdell case. 6 
It is impossible to square this statement with Yarbrough's con-
clusion that Black did not "condone flexible interpretations of the 
Article I, Section 10, contract clause." Black expressly endorsed 
the Blaisdell reasoning that he would later repudiate in Simmons. 
He said: "The Blaisdell decision represented a realistic appreciation 
of the fact that ours is an evolving society and that the general 
words of the contract clause were not intended to reduce the legisla-
tive branch of government to helpless impotency."? Here, Black 
sounds like Frankfurter. 
In another area, a similar inconsistency can be seen. Over 
Black's dissent, in Williams v. North Carolina II (1945) the Court 
allowed that state to reconsider the validity in North Carolina of a 
Nevada ex parte divorce decree despite the full faith and credit 
clause. Empowered to enforce this provision, Congress-as early as 
1790--had required that the judgments of state courts, such as the 
Nevada divorce in this case, be given full effect in other states. 
"Justice Black vigorously dissented ... [a]gain, for Black, the Con-
stitution's text itself resolved the issue." Recognizing that short 
residency requirements of states like Nevada created the conditions 
of a divorce mill, Black nonetheless warned that the Court "should 
not attempt to solve the 'divorce problem' by constitutional inter-
pretation" or in other words by holding that the full faith and credit 
5. 290 U.S. 398, 428 (1934). 
6. 313 U.S. 362, 382 (1941) (Black, J., dissenting). 
7. !d. at 383 (emphasis added). 
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clause does not apply completely to state judgments of divorce. 8 
Three years later Black joined an opinion which Justice Jack-
son condemned as failing to accord full faith and credit to a differ-
ent Nevada ex parte divorce decree. Here one Estin left his wife 
who thereupon successfully sued him in her home state of New 
York for separate maintenance. Several years later Mr. Estin ob-
tained a divorce from his wife in Nevada. Under New York law, 
once a divorce had been issued, Mr. Estin would no longer have 
been required to pay alimony. The constitutional question was 
whether Estin's Nevada ex parte divorce was to be given full faith 
and credit as if it had been obtained in New York. The Court's 
answer was the doctrine of "divisible divorce," as pragmatic a com-
promise as the Justices have ever engineered. As applied in Estin v. 
Estin, the Nevada divorce was given full faith and credit "insofar as 
it affects marital status" but not with respect to property 
distribution. 9 
Jackson's acerbic dissent reads like one Black would have writ-
ten had he been the consistent positivist that Yarbrough imagines. 
Said Jackson: "The Court reaches the Solomon-like conclusion that 
the Nevada decree is half good and half bad under the full faith and 
credit clause."w In fact, the Court, with Black's support, explicitly 
rejected any literal, absolutist construction of the constitutional 
text: 
An absolutist might quarrel with the result and demand a rule that once a divorce is 
granted, the whole of the marriage relation is dissolved, leaving no roots or tendrils 
of any kind. But there are few areas of the law in black and white. The greys are 
dominant and even among them the shades are innumerable. For the eternal prob-
lem of the law is one of making accommodations between conflicting interests. This 
is why most legal problems end as questions of degree. That is true of the present 
problem under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The question involves important 
considerations both of law and of policy which it is essential to state. II 
While it is certainly true, as Yarbrough reminds us, that Black 
did not always endorse every passage in an opinion in which he 
joined, he frequently, especially in his later years, wrote separate 
opinions disassociating himself from certain rhetoric in majority 
opinions which he otherwise supported. For example, Yarbrough 
writes that Black "proved equally alert to substantive due process 
rhetoric in opinions he was expected to join." Black despised sub-
stantive due process and "quickly reacted" to references to that 
doctrine in the opinion of the Court. Yet Justice Douglas in Estin 
8. 325 U.S. 226, 268 (1945) (Black, J., dissenting). 
9. 334 u.s. 541, 549 (1948). 
10. !d. at 554 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
II. /d. at 545. 
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endorsed judicial balancing of conflicting interests, without provok-
ing a dissent by Black. 
Having sought to present Black as the preeminent positivist, 
Yarbrough then takes us through the major areas of Black's juris-
prudence. He restates Black's position in each area and then con-
fronts the critics. 
II 
The due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments were particularly vexatious matters in Black's futile quest for 
objectivity in constitutional law. As a senator he opposed the po-
tentially limitless meaning the Old Court had assigned to those 
clauses, and so it is not surprising that Justice Black tried to confine 
their meaning. By 194 7 he was prepared to state that the first sec-
tion of the fourteenth amendment, treated "separately, and as a 
whole," was designed to incorporate the Bill of Rights. An appren-
tice positivist might be confused by such a statement, especially 
since Black would later treat each of the component clauses of sec-
tion one as meaning something other than the Bill of Rights. 
Since the amendment does not expressly incorporate the Bill of 
Rights, Black relied on his interpretation of the legislative history. 
Not only did the amendment embrace the Bill of Rights; its mean-
ing was, he argued in his Griswold dissent, confined to those familiar 
guarantees. He could not discern a right of privacy within the Bill 
of Rights and so he dissented from the Court's protection of marital 
"privacy" in Griswold (though, as we have seen, he was prepared to 
recognize in 1942 a right to procreate amidst the mysterious vapors 
of the equal protection clause). 
Criticism of his incorporation theory lasted throughout Black's 
judicial career, and ranged from direct, and often condescending, 
dismissals of his account of history to ironic arguments that the 
language of the fourteenth amendment could not bear Black's con-
torted construction. As Justice Frankfurter noted, the amend-
ment's language was a "strange way of saying" that the Bill of 
Rights henceforth applies against the states. 
Yet Yarbrough contends that Black never considered the due 
process or equal protection clauses as independent vehicles for in-
corporation. If this is true, it is unclear what Black meant by "sepa-
rately." Black did argue in 1968, in response to criticism from 
Justice Harlan, that the privileges and immunities clause, in effect, 
says that the Bill of Rights applies against the states; "there is no 
doubt" writes Yarbrough, quoting Black, that this was an "'emi-
nently reasonable way of expressing' " incorporation of the Bill of 
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Rights. This approach, however, does not resolve the "separately, 
and as a whole" problem. It is also redundant, and thus not very 
reasonable, if the due process clause, which immediately follows the 
privileges and immunities clause, is read also to include, as Black 
wished, rights such as counsel, trial by jury, and other procedural 
rights contained in the first eight amendments which the privileges 
and immunities clause supposedly already embraces. 
Moreover, the privileges and immunities clause refers only to 
rights of citizens of the United States. The prohibition against 
"cruel and unusual punishments," and the guarantee of an "impar-
tial jury," for example, cannot fairly be read as applicable only to 
citizens, and this probably induced Black to retreat to his convo-
luted "separately, and as a whole" rationale, as the due process and 
equal protection clauses refer to "persons," not citizens. 
On the problem of citizenship, Yarbrough merely says that the 
chief sponsors of the fourteenth amendment created an "anomaly" 
in not distinguishing between citizens and aliens, and Black simply 
accepted this anomaly. It is difficult to comprehend exactly what 
Yarbrough means, especially in the face of the preeminent place of 
the citizenship clause of the fourteenth amendment. Furthermore, 
Black derived from the privileges and immunities clause the right to 
travel interstate, but only for citizens. Yet Yarbrough argues that it 
was that same clause that, for Black, incorporated the Bill of Rights 
against the states, a set of rights that would not be granted only to 
citizens of the United States. 
Moreover, on the matter of redundancy generated by using the 
due process clause as a vehicle for incorporation, Yarbrough assails 
Frankfurter and Harlan for making such a criticism while them-
selves willing to find coincidental overlaps between the due process 
clause and some of the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Accusing 
antagonists of the same sin is, of course, no defense of the sin itself. 
And, even so, he says: "Justice Black never contended that the 
Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause incorporated the Bill 
of Rights." Instead, Black rested his case on the first section of the 
amendment, "separately, and as a whole." But how did the due 
process clause "separately" affect incorporation, and what did the 
citizenship and equal protection clauses each "separately" do? Yar-
brough's only answer apparently is that the due process clause was 
to mean only what its counterpart in the fifth amendment meant. 
Aside from the fact that Yarbrough has to concede that Black 
"never actually embraced in so many words" such a position, this 
position does not eliminate the tautology built into Black's enig-
matic posture. 
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The troubles multiply when we remember that Black equated 
the due process clause of the fifth amendment with the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth in discrimination cases involving the 
federal government, such as Korematsu v. United States (1944), 
where Black spoke for the six to three majority. Due process pre-
sumably is a barrier against racial discrimination which the equal 
protection clause, which immediately follows the due process clause 
of the fourteenth amendment, was written to address. The juridical 
circularity is painfully obvious and undermines Black's alleged 
positivism. 
Justice Black's reading of constitutional history has been at-
tacked by many scholars, notably Charles Fairman and Stanley 
Morrison, whose influential essays in the Stanford Law Review in 
1949 became almost the final word on the subject for many students 
of the incorporation debate, including Frankfurter and Harlan. In 
the strongest part of this book, Yarbrough once more confronts 
Black's critics, this time armed with evidence from a recent book by 
Michael Kent Curtis, who argues that Black's historical arguments 
on the incorporation of the Bill of Rights are stronger than most 
scholars have supposed.12 
Yarbrough does not argue that Black's incorporation position 
is correct; indeed, Curtis asserts (and Yarbrough acknowledges), 
that many of the framers of the fourteenth amendment wanted it to 
include more than the specific rights of the Bill of Rights-a kind of 
incorporation-"plus" posture which Black very much opposed. 
Yarbrough recognizes, however, as mentioned above, that in Ed-
wards v. California (1941) Black did go beyond the Bill of Rights in 
discovering in the privileges and immunities clause a right of citi-
zens to travel interstate. But this right to travel was the only right, 
beyond the Bill of Rights, that Black was prepared to draw from 
that clause. In Skinner, as we know, he found a place for the right 
to procreate in the equal protection clause. This metatextual rea-
soning, however, he discarded in Griswold, where his dissent reflects 
his mature jurisprudence, contradicting some of his earlier constitu-
tional positions. 
Nevertheless, Yarbrough concludes that Curtis's historical evi-
dence "demolishes the anti-incorporationists' position ... [and] 
shifts the burden of proof decidedly away from" Black and his sup-
porters. At a minimum, the historical evidence is more ambiguous 
than critics such as Frankfurter and Harlan supposed. That same 
evidence, however, equally calls into question Black's belief that the 
!2. No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS (1987). 
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Court should confine itself to the text of the Constitution in its 
search for "fundamental rights." 
III 
Yarbrough naturally devotes considerable attention to Black's 
first amendment views, particularly his absolutist interpretation. I 
argued in my book on Black that a commitment to an absolutist 
construction of the first amendment did not emerge in his jurispru-
dence until 1951 or 1952. Yarbrough rejects this, claiming that 
Black was an absolutist throughout his tenure on the Court. 
Black did not publicly endorse an absolutist approach to the 
first amendment until 1952, in his dissent in Carlson v. Landon. 
Yarbrough is impressed by an unpublished opinion that an angry 
Black composed in Bridges v. California (1941) originally as a dis-
sent; Black's side ultimately prevailed, and he emerged as spokes-
man for the Court, writing an opinion relying on the clear and 
present danger test. In interpreting that original dissent as an indi-
cation of early absolutism, Yarbrough enlists the support of Mark 
Silverstein who, in his book on Black and Frankfurter, writes: 
"Although Black did not characterize the First Amendment as an 
absolute in his Bridges dissent, that conclusion pervades the entire 
opinion." 13 
Yarbrough ignores, however, the principal conclusion that Sil-
verstein draws concerning the evolution of Black's first amendment 
position. "[W]ithin a year of Dennis [v. United States (1951 )], Black 
began to move toward an absolute reading of the First Amendment 
... [and] the move to absolutism was, in many ways, a response to 
Frankfurter."14 Silverstein is familiar with the recurrent antago-
nism between Black and Frankfurter. The former Harvard law pro-
fessor tended to lecture Black, a populist politician from Alabama, 
on the ways of the law, and Black did not accept such condescen-
sion. But in the 1940s, on free speech issues, Black could almost 
always depend on a solid libertarian plurality with his vote and 
those of Justices Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge. Adhering to a 
demanding clear and present danger test, and the "preferred posi-
tion" doctrine, this "Axis," as Frankfurter described the four liber-
als, seemed almost always able to attract at least the necessary fifth 
vote. 
It was nearly, as Justice Douglas in his autobiography proudly 
remembered, a "Golden Age" for liberalism. 15 Black was very 
13. M. SILVERSTEIN, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITHS 183 (1984). 
14. /d. at 202. 
15. W.O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 290 (1980). 
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much in charge, and he did not need the shield of literal absolutes to 
fight on the free speech front: he had the votes and the rationale of 
the preferred position doctrine. Brother Frankfurter did his pontifi-
cating primarily in dissent. But when Murphy and Rutledge sud-
denly died in 1949, the Golden Age abruptly came to an end. As 
the Court then confronted Cold War free speech cases, Black now 
found himself in the minority, and a timid Court, led intellectually 
by Frankfurter, succumbed to the paranoia sweeping the political 
scene during the bleak era of McCarthyism. The preferred position 
doctrine disappeared into history. It was at this point that Black 
"moved," as Silverstein carefully explains, to his absolutism. Refer-
ence to the "no law" provision of the first amendment now became 
his sword in his confrontation with Frankfurter. 
For a while, Black's absolutist rhetoric was a powerful rebuttal 
to a Court majority that was frequently deciding cases by admitting 
that freedom of speech was being violated but reasoning that the 
government had the authority to do so if, on balance, the govern-
ment's interest was great enough. But once the free speech issues 
shifted from subversion to protest movements in the 1960s, Black's 
absolutism became impractical and irrelevant as a means to imple-
ment the first amendment guarantees. As Silverstein concludes, the 
Justice would find it necessary to create "seemingly arbitrary excep-
tions which served to undermine doctrinal consistency,"J6 a conclu-
sion Yarbrough strongly rejects. Under the preferred position 
doctrine, on the other hand, flexibility (that is, practicality) was at 
Black's disposal in unusual cases of governmental need. 
This explanation far more convincingly accounts for Black's 
judicial behavior than Yarbrough's laboriously developed and com-
pletely unpersuasive argument that Black was always an absolutist. 
In the 1940s Black balanced interests in free speech cases, though of 
course he usually read the scales in favor of freedom of speech. 
That he hardly ever voted in favor of suppression of expression is 
beside the point; Murphy and Rutledge were also devout propo-
nents of free speech but, as Yarbrough agrees, they defended liber-
tarian results without relying on absolutism. 
Yarbrough rests his thesis of Black's consistent absolutism on 
the undelivered Bridges dissent, which he regards as "conclusive ev-
idence." Black's ultimate use of the clear and present danger test in 
Bridges itself and in a string of other cases in the 1940s is, claims 
Yarbrough, of "dubious value." That it took Black almost fifteen 
years openly to admit an allegiance to absolutism is, in Yarbrough's 
account, evidence of Black's "tactical decision to postpone a public 
16. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 13, at 189-90 n.35. 
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avowal of his absolutist philosophy." Black, in other words, only 
pretended to be following the clear and present danger test because 
absolutism was "such a controversial position ... unacceptable to 
any colleague." 
We are asked to believe that Black for a decade and a half 
engaged in a pragmatic pretense only to emerge later with the to-
tally unpragmatic but dogmatic claim that "plain language, easily 
understood," resolves free speech cases. The absolutist Black would 
repeatedly assail his Court for nullifying free speech rights. In Wil-
kinson v. United States (1961 ), for example, he blasted away: 
"Their ineffectiveness ... stems, not from any lack of precision in 
the statement of those principles, but from the refusal to apply those 
principles precisely stated." Yet in Marsh v. Alabama (1946), 
speaking for the Court, Justice Black was presumably a closet abso-
lutist, tactfully ignoring the text to avoid controversy when he 
wrote: "As we have stated before, the right to exercise the liberties 
safeguarded by the First Amendment 'lies at the foundation of free 
government by free men' and we must in all cases 'weigh the cir-
cumstances and ... appraise the ... reasons ... in support of the 
regulation ... of the rights.' " 
Yarbrough admits that history contradicts, rather than rein-
forces, Black's version of the first amendment, but he jumps that 
hurdle by reminding us that "his absolutism was based ultimately 
on the amendment's words." Presumably that excuses Black's defi-
ance of historical intent. But when he interpreted the "free exer-
cise" of religion clause, where literalist absolutism is patently 
impractical, even though "no law" still means no law, Black con-
cluded that that clause meant only religious "speech" and "beliefs" 
(thus making the guarantee redundant, in view of the free speech 
provision). Yarbrough explains: 
[T]hat construction was, after all, compatible with the First Amendment's general 
emphasis and based on the logical assumption that the amendment's framers surely 
did not intend to insulate all religiously motivated conduct from governmental 
regulations. 
Just four pages later, he describes Black as "a Justice whose First 
Amendment jurisprudence turned on language rather than on an 
evaluation of the interests a particular construction of the Constitu-
tion might serve." 
What of "the right of the people peaceably to assemble"? That 
guarantee also falls under the absolutist umbrella of the first amend-
ment, but, like religious liberty, assembly cannot realistically be un-
derstood as having absolute constitutional immunity. Black's 
positivist solution to this problem was to insist that the right, 
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though absolute, was not exercisable on either private or public 
property! Confronted with the obvious criticism that such an "ab-
solute" right is meaningless, if not laughable, Yarbrough responds 
that, in one of his interviews with Black just before his death, the 
Justice agreed that government could, indeed, shut off access to 
public places for general purposes of assembly; but since everybody 
loves a parade now and then, the government would never do such 
a thing. Thus if the American Legion were allowed to march, 
"equal protection" would demand no less access for other groups. 
In other words, an expansive interpretation of the equal protection 
clause would rescue the right of assembly from the eclipse of 
Black's pathetic (but absolute) construction. 
Probably the most controversial dimension of Black's absolu-
tist reading of the first amendment was his claim that the speech 
clause did not protect conduct such as the symbolic expression of 
protesters in the 1960s. Inasmuch as all speech involves some con-
duct, this distinction was uncertain and frequently arbitrary. Yet it 
was Black's principal means of escape from the implications of his 
absolutism. For example, in the 1940s, when he was not yet cor-
nered by absolutism, Black recognized picketing as a form of ex-
pression usually entitled to first amendment protection; but in the 
1960s he asserted that protest marches were not "speech" and thus 
not covered by his absolute first amendment. Also, in his last year 
on the Court Black, in Cohen v. California (1971}, voted to uphold 
an "offensive conduct" conviction of a man who walked into a Los 
Angeles County courtroom with the message "Fuck the Draft" in-
scribed on the back of his jacket. To Black and his fellow dissent-
ers, this behavior was "mainly conduct and little speech." Yet it 
was this little speech which induced Cohen's arrest and brought 
about his conviction, for surely this man would not have been no-
ticed, much less arrested, had these words not been emblazoned 
upon his jacket. And Justice Black absolutely and routinely pro-
tected four-letter words in obscenity cases. 
In Tinker v. Des Moines School District (1969) Black dissented 
when the Court ruled that, under the facts of this case, children 
could not constitutionally be prohibited from wearing black arm-
bands in school as a means of protesting against the Vietnam War. 
The Court interpreted the armbands as conduct "closely akin to 
pure speech." Moreover, school authorities had apparently allowed 
other symbolic expression, such as the Iron Cross. Even in the field 
of expressive conduct Black at least thought that the first amend-
ment could not tolerate discriminatory regulations, but, as Y ar-
brough explains, Black believed that the first amendment did not 
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apply to schools, courtrooms, or other places dedicated to special 
purposes (what places are not?). Yarbrough states that Black's 
withdrawal of first amendment protection extended to "all levels of 
state-supported education." 
How does a simple reading of the text lead to this unbelievably 
narrow application of the first amendment? If the text justified 
Black's withdrawal of first amendment protection from schools, 
then it was only by fiat that Black rigorously applied the first 
amendment to proscribe prayer in the public schools or to prohibit 
compulsory flag salutes or to protect teachers from dismissal be-
cause of their political beliefs or associations. By its terms the first 
amendment does not distinguish between schools and streets, court-
rooms and Congress, and then only for some of its guarantees. 
Similarly, the text fails to justify Black's answer to the question 
whether a witness can be held in contempt for failure to answer a 
judge's inquisitions about his political beliefs. The "courtroom," 
Professor Yarbrough astonishingly states, was an "area to which 
Justice Black's absolute First Amendment most assuredly did not 
extend." 
Whenever Black in the 1940s protected certain conduct, such 
as picketing, Yarbrough explains that it was only because the regu-
lation in question was unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, and 
not because such conduct was covered by the terms of the first 
amendment. But Black repeatedly acknowledged that picketing 
was a form of expression covered by the first amendment up to the 
point of creating a clear and present danger. His later attempts to 
draw a line between speech and conduct and then to reconcile them 
with his jurisprudence of the 1940s are as unsatisfactory as Y ar-
brough's defense of those attempts. 
In fact, in 194 7 Black seems to have rejected the possibility of 
drawing that line consistently with the meaning of the first amend-
ment. In United Public Workers v. Mitchell he dissented from a 
decision upholding a provision of federal law prohibiting a certain 
class of federal employees from taking "any active part in political 
management or in political campaigns." These employees, how-
ever, could vote and "express their opinions on all political subjects 
and candidates." Black found a "hopeless contradiction" in that 
the act allowed people to speak but not act in political campaigns. 
He said: "Popular government, to be effective, must permit and 
encourage much wider political activity by all the people." Deny-
ing the people the right to "take political action would be inconsis-
tent with the First Amendment's guaranty of freedom of speech, 
press, assembly, and petition." Common sense tells us that political 
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action cannot be protected absolutely, but once Black embraced ab-
solutism he severely limited the meaning of that action; he could 
not protect certain actions at all because he could not protect them 
absolutely. 
IV 
Tinsley Yarbrough emerges from this book as Black's apolo-
gist. He finds little to criticize in Black's long tenure on the Court, 
except that he is unhappy with the Justice's waflling in the field of 
equal protection and on the exclusionary rule. Otherwise, he 
merely echoes Black's own defenses, including the unpersuasive and 
inconsistent rationales. 
For instance, in explaining Black's refusal in Bartkus v. Illinois 
(1959) to condition the rule against double jeopardy "on considera-
tions of federalism," he supports Black's dissent, arguing that such 
considerations are "stated nowhere in the Constitution's text." On 
another matter, rejecting Frankfurter's federalism arguments for re-
fusing to apply the Bill of Rights against the states, Yarbrough 
notes that "[p]ure considerations of federalism, like the desire to 
clothe judges with authority to do 'justice,' would carry no weight, 
of course, with one of Justice Black's jurisprudential persuasion 
.... [It] would have been unthinkable for Black to yield to such 
concerns." But in Younger v. Harris (1971), where Black wrote the 
Court's opinion curbing federal judicial intervention in state court 
proceedings, Yarbrough writes that a "consideration underlying the 
Court's position was the doctrine of comity implicit in 'Our Feder-
alism'" which Black advanced. The same "philosophy of federal-
ism,'' according to Yarbrough, explains Black's position regarding 
the constitutionality of the preclearance provision of the 1965 
Voting Rights Act. What Yarbrough elsewhere emphatically char-
acterizes as an "unthinkable" ground for positivist judicial decision-
making, the positivist Black not only thought about but openly 
utilized, according to Yarbrough's own analysis. 
Black undoubtedly tried to limit judicial discretion, especially 
the discretion that he found in Frankfurter's judicial philosophy. 
But Black also fiercely adhered to his ideological convictions, which 
doubtless found their way into the interstices of his judicial legacy; 
the tension between his jurisprudence and his personal values ac-
counts, perhaps, for most of the inconsistencies. 
If Justice Douglas is to be believed, Black's unfriendly response 
to mass demonstrations in the 1960s derived from the fact that 
"Black's house was picketed en masse" after it had become known, 
soon after his appointment to the Court, that he had been a member 
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of the Ku Klux Klan. I? Douglas often told the famous story that 
when he was appointed to the Court Chief Justice Hughes explained 
that a Justice's decisions were based ninety percent on emotions. In 
his autobiography Douglas continued: 
Frankfurter was indeed the most obvious example in my time of the truth of 
Hughes's observation. Black was a close second. Each went at a problem with 
great feeling and charged with powerful emotions. Black was more frank about the 
process; he never took the Frankfurter stance that he was following "the law" and 
putting aside his own feelings and desires in reaching a decision I 8 
Yarbrough believes that Black's critics are the ones guilty of 
being result-oriented; they criticize Black's jurisprudence because it 
failed to support the causes that they think the Constitution should 
protect. This is "the essence, I believe, of much of the scholarly 
criticism directed at his judicial and constitutional philosophy." Of 
course, the same could be said of the critics of every other Justice; 
from Sutherland to Rehnquist, the Justices' critics have commonly 
been "result-oriented." Indeed, Black may have had more than his 
share of friendly critics. Some critics are, of course, driven by dis-
dain for the decisions Black reached, and they sometimes do not 
pretend otherwise, as when Glendon Schubert unabashedly claimed 
that Black's decisions were not in line with the times and that he 
was too old for the job. It is simply not accurate, however, to char-
acterize Black's critics as having no more reason to question his 
jurisprudence than those who angrily wrote him "crank mail" when 
he handed down unpopular decisions. 
Much criticism of Black arose in the context of the antagonism 
between Black and Frankfurter. For example, much of Wallace 
Mendelson's relentless, and frequently baseless, attack on Black de-
rived from his mystical admiration for Frankfurter; his hero (for 
whom Mendelson served as law clerk) was the model judge, im-
mune from criticism. Mendelson was too fond of Frankfurter to see 
the shortcomings in Frankfurter's jurisprudence that more detached 
commentators could readily perceive. 
Professor Yarbrough, it seems, has a similar problem; he too is 
excessively fond of his hero. It is unlikely that scholars who have 
discovered discrepancies or disarray in Black's jurisprudence will 
need to reconsider their assessments as a result of this book. Black 
was a giant with glaring weaknesses as well as admirable strengths. 
Professor Yarbrough seems to be impressed by one dimension and 
predisposed to ignore most of the other. 
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